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Problem area 
Airworthiness regulations require 
proof that aircraft can be operated 
safely. This implies that critical 
components must be replaced or 
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compromised. The current fatigue 
philosophies underlying the 
approaches for guaranteeing safety 
are called Safe-Life and Damage 
Tolerance. Both philosophies often 
lead to very conservative fatigue 
lifetimes.  
 
Description of work 
This paper describes a stochastic 
methodology for predicting aircraft 
component fatigue lifetimes and 
optimum inspection intervals. An 
introduction covers some basics in 
design philosophies and the main 
aspects of deterministic and 
stochastic analysis. Then a 
stochastic life approach (SLAP) is 
presented. This consists of three 
steps: (1) determining the failure 
distribution; (2) reverse crack 
growth analyses from the failure 
distribution to obtain the initial 
inspection time and corresponding 
crack length distribution; and (3) 
forward crack growth analyses to 
determine a schedule for repeated 
inspections. The SLAP 
methodology is illustrated using in-
service inspection data of the upper 
longerons of F-16 aircraft from the 
Royal Netherlands Air Force and 
compared against results obtained 
by the traditional deterministic 
analysis. 
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The example resulted in an 
inspection scheme that differed 
significantly from the deterministic 
ones and demonstrated the 
excessive conservatism of the 
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SLAP approach has a number of 
clear advantages. However, a 
number of issues need further 
exploration as well. 
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SLAP can serve as an alternative to 
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A stochastic approach to determine lifetimes and inspection 
schemes for aircraft components  
 
Frank Grooteman * 
 
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR, Anthony Fokkerweg 2 1059 CM Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper describes a stochastic methodology for predicting aircraft component fatigue lifetimes and 
optimum inspection intervals. An introduction covers some basics in design philosophies and the main 
aspects of deterministic and stochastic analysis. Then a stochastic life approach (SLAP) is presented. 
This consists of three steps: (1) determining the failure distribution; (2) reverse crack growth analyses 
from the failure distribution to obtain the initial inspection time and corresponding crack length 
distribution; and (3) forward crack growth analyses to determine a schedule for repeated inspections. 
The SLAP methodology is illustrated using in-service inspection data from an actual aircraft component 
and comparing the results with a deterministic analysis. Concluding remarks summarise the findings and 
address open issues. 
  
Keywords: Damage tolerance; Fatigue crack growth; Probabilistic analysis; Life prediction; Stochastic 
analysis 
 
 
Nomenclature 
A2   Anderson-Darling test statistic 
a   crack length 
ai   initial crack length 
ad   deterministic detectable crack length 
adet , apod  stochastic detectable crack length 
acr   critical crack length 
ninsp   number of planned inspections 
p   probability value 
pth   threshold probability value on service life 
t   lifetime 
                                                     
* Tel.: +31-527-24-8727; fax.: +31-527-24-8210. 
E-mail address: grooten@nlr.nl (Frank Grooteman). 
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t0  Weibull location parameter 
teconomic  economic lifetime 
tinitial  time at initial inspection 
Δtrepeat  repeat inspection interval 
β  Weibull shape parameter 
η  Weibull scale parameter 
μ  mean value 
σ  standard deviation 
ASIP  Aircraft Structural Integrity Programme 
CAMS  Core Automated Maintenance System 
CSI  Crack Severity Index 
EIFS  Equivalent Initial Flaw Size 
EIFSD  Equivalent Initial Flaw Size Distribution 
FH  Flight Hour 
FORM  First-Order Reliability Method 
MLE  Maximum likelihood estimation 
NLR  National Aerospace Laboratory, the Netherlands 
POD  Probability Of Detection 
POF  Probability Of Failure 
RAP  Reliability Analysis Program 
RNLAF Royal Netherlands Air Force 
SLAP  Stochastic Life APproach 
S – N  Stress versus Number of cycles fatigue test data 
SORM  Second-Order Reliability Method 
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1 Introduction 
This paper describes a stochastic fatigue life methodology, SLAP (stochastic life approach), for military 
aircraft components as an alternative to the current deterministic and partially stochastic approaches. 
Before presenting SLAP, some background information is given about the current life philosophies and 
general issues relating to deterministic and stochastic analysis.  
 
1.1 Current Design Philosophies 
Airworthiness regulations require proof that aircraft can be operated safely. This implies that critical 
components must be replaced or repaired before safety is compromised. The fatigue philosophies 
underlying the approaches for guaranteeing safety are called Safe-Life and Damage Tolerance.  
The Safe-Life philosophy is based on the concept that significant damage, i.e. fatigue cracking, will not 
develop during the service life of a component. The life is initially determined from fatigue test data  
(S – N curves) and calculations using a cumulative damage “law”. Then the design safe-life is obtained 
by applying a safety factor. When the service life equals the design safe-life the component must be 
replaced. However, there are two major drawbacks to this approach: (1) components are taken out of 
service even though they may have substantial remaining lives; (2) despite all precautions, cracks 
sometimes occur prematurely. This latter fact led the US Air Force to introduce the Damage Tolerance 
philosophy [1]. 
The Damage Tolerance philosophy recognises that damage can occur and develop during the service life 
of a component. Also, it assumes that cracks or flaws can be present in new structures. Safety is 
obtained from this approach by the requirements that either (1) any damage be detected by routine 
inspection before it results in a dangerous reduction of the static strength (inspectable components), or 
(2) initial damage shall not grow to a dangerous size during the service life (non-inspectable 
components). For Damage Tolerance analysis to be successful it must be possible to: 
 
• Define either a minimum crack length ad that will not go undetected during routine inspections, or 
else an initial crack length ai , nominally based on pre-service inspection capability. 
• Predict crack growth during the time until the next inspection or until the design service life is 
reached. 
 
An adjunct to Damage Tolerance is Durability analysis. This is an economic life assessment for 
components that are not safety-critical. The prediction of crack growth is similar to that for Damage 
Tolerance, except that a much smaller initial crack length ai is used. 
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1.2 Deterministic Analysis 
Safe-Life and Damage Tolerance analyses are basically deterministic, i.e. they do not consider the 
variability of parameters used in the analyses. Instead, they apply scatter and safety factors to the 
obtained fatigue lifetime or crack growth life. In general, such analyses result in over-conservative life 
estimates and inspection intervals. Even so, the reliability (safety level) of the structure and its 
components is not properly known. Moreover, the safety factors applied are quite arbitrary, although 
historically successful probably because of the high degree of conservatism [2]. Other disadvantages of 
deterministic approaches are: 
 
• Lighter and more efficient structures can require new materials and design methodologies with 
different (unknown) safety factors. 
• Deterministic analyses are often compared with test data. However, the comparisons are 
questionable, especially when the data are limited and have significant scatter. In such cases 
agreement between a deterministic analysis and test data can be fortuitous. It would be better, or 
essential, to do a stochastic analysis to compare with the test data. 
 
1.3 Stochastic Analysis 
The disadvantages of deterministic approaches provide a strong case for stochastic analysis. Good 
stochastic tools are now available, but they are not widely used. One reason is unfamiliarity. Another is 
the lack of data for generating proper distribution functions. However, this problem can often be 
overcome by combining available data with engineering judgement, and allocating the distribution type 
according to the type of phenomenon and goodness-of-fit tests. Even so, there should be experimental 
programmes to collect sufficient statistical data. This is still not common practice in fatigue engineering. 
The following steps can be distinguished in any stochastic analysis, Grooteman, et al. [3]: 
 
• Choice of random variables and their distribution functions. 
As stated above, it is often possible to do this. In cases where it is unclear whether an analysis 
parameter, or combination of parameters, should be treated as a stochastic variable, a sensitivity 
analysis can be done. In other words, does the variation in these parameters cause any significant 
scatter in the result? If not, these parameters can be treated deterministically. 
• Choice of failure functions. 
These are usually the same failure criteria as in the deterministic analysis and thus straightforward.  
• Solution of the stochastic problem. 
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There are many stochastic methods, Bjerager [4]. The most well-known is the Monte Carlo method, 
but it is inefficient when dealing with the small probabilities of failure relevant to engineering 
structures. More efficient methods, such as FORM, SORM and Importance Sampling are now 
available. At the NLR a stochastic tool called RAP (reliability analysis program, Grooteman [5]) has 
been developed. RAP includes many of the more modern methods. Also, it operates on top of any 
deterministic tool and needs no modifications to do this. The extra input compared to deterministic 
analysis consists of specification of the random variables and their distribution functions, 
specification of the failure function(s), and selection of the stochastic method to be applied.  
• Interpretation of the results. 
An important issue is the allowed probability of failure (POF). Table 1 [6] gives some target 
probability values for lifetimes, based on the relative costs of safety measures and the consequences 
of failure. In general, the target lifetime POF will be about 10-3 for engineering problems. For 
military aircraft structures a typical lifetime is 104 flight hours, giving a POF ~ 10-7 per flight hour 
(FH).  
 
Table 1   Lifetime probability of failure (POF) targets according to ISO 2394, [6] 
Consequences of failure Relative costs of safety 
measures Small Some Moderate Great 
High 1 10-1 10-2 10-3 
Moderate 10-1 10-2 10-3 10-4 
Low 10-2 10-3 10-4 10-5 
 
 
2 Alternative Stochastic Life APproach (SLAP) 
During development of Damage Tolerance it was realised that basing an initial crack length ai on pre-
service inspection capability would be very conservative. This realisation led to the concept of 
equivalent initial flaw sizes (EIFS). EIFS values are a substitute for any real (and unknown) initial 
damage in the structure. The problem is that EIFS are derived by back-calculation from actual large 
cracks, using macrocrack growth models. These models are unable to describe the real behaviour of 
cracks that grow from any (small) initial damage. The resulting EIFS distributions (EIFSD) are 
unrealistic. 
Instead of using EIFS to predict crack growth from the beginning of service, an alternative is to start the 
analysis from the end of service life. To do this, one needs the service life failure distribution that 
represents the probability of failure for a certain component life. In the design stage this distribution is 
unknown, but the Weibull analysis described in Appendix A can be used with a limited number of test 
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data and past experience to provide a conservative lower bound. From this lower bound distribution a 
conservative first estimate of the inspection scheme is obtained. 
During service the calculated failure distribution, unlike the EIFS distribution, can be verified and 
updated using inspection data. In turn, the updated failure distribution can be used to update the 
inspection scheme. In fact, even before reaching the initial inspection the current service lives of the 
components can be used to improve the estimate of the failure distribution and the inspection scheme. In 
this way an adaptive and increasingly less conservative analysis will lead to a minimal inspection effort 
for the required safety level. 
These considerations led to SLAP. This approach consists of the following three main steps: 
 
1. Construct the failure distribution. 
2. Reverse crack growth analyses. 
3. Forward crack growth analyses, including inspections. 
 
The basic methodology pertaining to these main steps are depicted in flow chart below and will be 
discussed next. Section 3 of the paper gives more details by illustrating the approach for a realistic 
application.  
 
 
Forward CG analysis from 
in-service cracks up to 
failure 
Failure distribution 
Initial inspection time tinit 
Crack size distribution at tinit
Repeat inspection 
scheme
Reverse CG analysis up to 
detectable crack length 
Forward CG analysis 
including inspections 
Start of SLAP
End of SLAP
Step 1 
In-service cracks 
Step 2 
Step 3 
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Step 1: Construct the failure distribution 
 
Figure 1 is a schematic of the service life failure distribution. As mentioned above, this can be obtained 
from a Weibull analysis, detailed in Appendix A. The initial failure distribution is conservative (lower 
bound) and should be updated during the lifetime of the component by service data (failures and non-
failures) as they become available.  
It is important to note that all the scatter introduced by material properties, load spectrum, etc., is 
included intrinsically in this failure distribution. Moreover, an estimate of the scatter present in the 
components can be updated by using inspection and failure information from service. This is a major 
advantage over trying to use the variability of all the analysis parameters, since such information is often 
difficult or impossible to acquire. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Step 1 of SLAP: construction of the service life failure distribution 
 
Step 2: Reverse crack growth analyses: Determine initial inspection time and corresponding crack 
length distribution 
 
a) Figure 2 illustrates reverse calculations from the service life failure distribution of the component. 
These calculations are made until an in-service detectable crack length, adet , is reached. The 
resulting PDF-adet distribution gives the service times needed for cracks of length adet to become 
present in the components. This in-service detectable crack length, adet , is a stochastic variable and 
is defined by the probability of detection (POD) distribution function of the applied inspection 
method. 
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Fig. 2.  Step 2a of SLAP: reverse crack growth analyses from the service life failure distribution to a 
detectable crack length 
 
b) Figure 3 adds the next part of the analysis, step 2b. From the PDF-adet distribution obtained in the 
previous step an initial inspection at time tinitial can be selected in the lower left tail of this 
distribution. This is characterised by a low probability value denoted the threshold probability value 
pth , here assumed to be pth=1 %, and depicted by the shaded area in the figure. An inspection before 
tinitial is unfeasible, since any cracks would be difficult to find with a reasonable chance of detection. 
Determining tinitial in this way gives a realistically conservative estimate that automatically covers 
the crack initiation and early crack growth periods, without the need to model them. This is a very 
significant advantage, since there are no well-established models for these stages of fatigue in 
aircraft structures. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Step 2b of SLAP: selection of the initial inspection time 
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c) Figure 4 adds the important step 2c, in which the crack length distribution function PDF-tinitial is 
obtained from all the reverse calculations down to tinitial. As before, there is no need for modelling 
crack initiation and early crack growth. This might not be completely true when considering the 
lower tail of the PDF-tinitial distribution. However, this part of the PDF will not contribute to the 
probability of failure, discussed in the next step, and is therefore irrelevant here. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Step 2c of SLAP: continued reverse analyses to determine the crack length distribution at the 
initial inspection 
 
Step 3: Forward crack growth analyses including inspections: Determine repeat inspections 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the step 3 forward stochastic crack growth analyses, which begin at tinitial and use the 
PDF- tinitial crack distribution as input. During these analyses a repeat inspection scheme (denoted by the 
symbol ×), with inspection interval Δtrepeat , is simulated using the POD distribution function appropriate 
to the inspection method: see subsection 3.3 for details about the POD.  
Once a crack has been detected, the component is assumed to be replaced (or repaired). The crack 
growth analysis is continued at the point of detection by specifying another period tinitial in which a new 
crack will initiate and grow, and also at this tinitial drawing a new crack length value from the crack 
length distribution function (PDF- tinitial). 
Each crack growth calculation stops (a) when the component has failed, that is when a crack is missed 
during all inspections; or (b) when the economic lifetime, teconomic , of the component is reached. 
Performing the above in a stochastic scheme enables determining a probability of failure (POF) value. 
This POF value can be compared with the required safety level, and if unsatisfactory the calculations 
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can be redone with different repeat inspection schemes. In this way an optimum inspection scheme can 
be determined as will be demonstrated in section 3.4.  
 
 
 
Fig. 5.  Step 3 of SLAP: forward crack growth analyses, illustrated for five crack lengths at tinitial , and 
schematic inspection intervals. N.B.: the previous steps 2a and 2b, see figures 2 and 3, are 
omitted here for clarity 
 
 
3 First Application of SLAP 
3.1 Introduction 
SLAP was first used for the upper longerons of RNLAF F-16 aircraft, see figure 6. The longerons are 
2024-T62 aluminium tee-extrusions that distribute flight loads from the fuselage upper skin to the 
centre-fuselage section. High positive-g loads cause fatigue cracking in the longeron tab radii. 
The longerons are inspection points (there are others) for the F-16 Aircraft Structural Integrity 
Programme (ASIP). Detected crack lengths are registered in the Core Automated Maintenance System 
(CAMS) database. Many inspection data are available, making the longerons ideal for illustrating the 
SLAP approach. A realistic failure distribution can be obtained, and cancelling the need for updating the 
failure distribution. More importantly, results obtained with SLAP can be compared with the results 
obtained from the standard deterministic approach as discussed in the next section. 
 
  
NLR-TP-2008-099 
  
 15 
 
 
Fig. 6.  F-16 ASIP 3005 inspection point: upper longeron tab radii with manual eddy current 
inspections [7]  
 
3.2 Baseline deterministic analysis 
Since the longerons are not safety-critical, a baseline deterministic Durability analysis was done, starting 
from a 0.178 mm corner crack and ending at the "functional impairment" crack length of 4.75 mm. The 
crack growth curve was obtained from a Lockheed Martin crack growth model and a load spectrum 
representing the average usage of RNLAF F-16s. This crack growth model is based on the well-known 
Forman equation and the generalised Willenborg retardation model, and has been validated with data 
from a test aircraft [7], i.e. it gives the correct trend of actual crack growth. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7.  RNLAF longeron mean crack growth curve. Functional impairment at 5310 flight hours (FH) 
 
  
NLR-TP-2008-099 
  
 16 
Figure 7 shows the calculated mean crack growth curve. Figure 8 superimposes the Damage Tolerance 
inspection requirements [1] on the crack growth curve, whereby the 90/95% reliably detectable crack 
length, ad , for in-service inspections was specified to be 2.54 mm. These requirements leads to the 
following inspection scheme, which, however, has an unknown safety level: 
 
 Initial inspection 2655 FH 
 Repeat inspection     62 FH 
 
 
 
Fig. 8.  Deterministic Damage Tolerance inspection requirements [1] for the RNLAF longerons 
 
3.3 Probability of detection 
The baseline deterministic analysis in subsection 3.2 had to use a single valued 90/95% ad to derive the 
inspection scheme. However, SLAP uses a POD curve, which represents a cumulative distribution 
function giving the chances of detecting different sized cracks. Here enough inspection data are 
available to construct a reliable POD curve. Otherwise a conservative POD distribution can be obtained 
from a well known handbook Rummel [8]. The POD curve was constructed as follows: 
 
• The Lockheed Martin model was used to reverse-calculate crack growth for the detected longeron 
cracks in individual aircraft, thereby obtaining estimates of missed crack lengths during previous 
inspections. This could be done because the load spectrum of each aircraft is tracked and assigned a 
crack severity index (CSI) representing a measure of the severity of the load spectrum in terms of 
the average usage Jonge [9]. This information is used to improve the individual crack growth 
curves. 
• Choice of the most appropriate distribution function for the POD curve (log-normal) and derivation 
of the distribution parameters, see Fahr, et al. [10], [11]. 
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The data consisted of 24 hits (detection) and 121 misses (estimates of non-detection). These gave a log-
normal maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) fit with mean μ = 1.34 mm and variance σ = 0.645 mm. 
Fig. 9 shows the mean POD curve (50% confidence). 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.  Mean POD curve for hit (Δ) and miss (x) data from manual eddy current inspection of the 
RNLAF F-16 longeron tab radii 
 
 
3.4 Application of SLAP 
This section presents the results obtained with SLAP, according to the approach in chapter 2, and 
implemented at the NLR in a computer code.  
 
Step 1: Construct the failure distribution: Weibull analysis 
 
No failure (functional impairment) data were available for the longerons, but there were sufficient in-
service inspection data to realistically demonstrate SLAP. The failure times were estimated by forward 
crack growth analyses, again using the CSI corrected Lockheed Martin model, from the detected crack 
lengths up to functional impairment. These failure times were used in a Weibull analysis, according to 
the procedure described in Appendix A, to determine the failure distribution. Figure 10 shows the results 
on Weibull probability paper, which ensures a straight line for any Weibull cumulative distribution 
function. The straight line is the MLE fit, whose coefficients are given in the diagram. These 
coefficients have the following meanings (see also Appendices A and B): 
 
• The location parameter t0 represents the life (2624 FH) below which no failures are expected. Note 
that the x-axis of figure 10 reads Life – t0, not just Life.  
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• The sum of t0 and the scale parameter η represents the life (3072 FH) when 63.2% of the longerons 
will be functionally impaired.  
• The shape parameter β represents the rapidity of the failure process. The value β =2.57 indicates a 
slow failure mechanism. 
• A² is the test statistic value for the Anderson-Darling test, Appendix B. This is a goodness-of-fit test 
especially sensitive to deviations in the distribution tails, which are important for SLAP. The value 
A²=0.315 indicates a very good fit. 
 
The 95% confidence limits for the distribution parameters are:  
t0: 2297 < 2624 < 2736 
η: 380 < 448 < 528 
β: 1.85 < 2.57 < 3.56 
 
These confidence limits are reasonably narrow because of the sufficiency of data. To ensure a 
conservative failure distribution the lower bound values for t0 and η , and the upper bound value for β 
can be selected.  
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Weibull analysis and its 95% confidence limits (dashed lines) applied to the estimated 
functional impairment times for the longerons 
 
Step 2: Reverse crack growth analyses: Determine initial inspection time and corresponding crack 
length distribution 
 
In the basic SLAP approach presented in section 2 no restrictions have been made regarding the 
inclusion of scatter present in a separate deterministic model parameter. Each parameter can be treated 
as a random variable. As such, scatter in material properties could be taken into account as a separate 
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random quantity. In the current example this scatter was not taken into account explicitly for the 
following reasons. 
The reverse crack growth analysis from an in-service crack down to the detectable crack length should 
in theory be based on the true material properties for the component in which the crack was found. In 
general, these values are unknown. Taking into account the whole scatter band for these material 
properties in a reverse crack growth analysis, for each in-service crack, is fundamentally wrong and can 
lead to a large over-estimation of the true scatter. For example, if an in-service crack lies on one of the 
outer boundaries of the crack size distribution, an extra artificial scatter band will result. 
In the SLAP approach this issue is circumvented by (1) using in-service information gathered during 
inspections as a starting point, which intrinsically includes all the scatter sources; and (2) restricting the 
approach to the long crack region, being a small part of the total lifetime. The latter is a very important 
characteristic of the approach, because almost all the material property related scatter in the failure 
distribution has been developed in the initiation, micro and short crack growth period before tinitial. This 
part of the scatter is included, implicitly, in the algorithm.  
Moreover, for the current example of a military fighter plane the scatter in the load spectrum is far more 
important than scatter from other sources in the final part of the lifetime (long cracks). This scatter is 
taken into account here via the CSI index that represents the severity of the load spectrum, which is 
tracked for each individual aircraft. 
Therefore, not explicitly including the material scatter as a separate scatter source will only cause small 
deviations in the PDF-adet and PDF-tinitial distributions. In turn, these deviations will somewhat affect the 
value of tinitial, and later, during step 3, Δtrepeat. 
For the reverse calculations the threshold percentage of detectable cracks, pth , was set to 0.1%. This low 
percentage was chosen to enable a straightforward study of the influence of a range of adet values on 
tinitial. Figure 11 gives an example for adet = 1.52 mm. For clarity only the 1%, 50% (mean) and 99% 
crack growth curves are shown. The intersection of the PDF-adet distribution and the PDF-tinitial 
distribution for a threshold percentage pth of 0.1% corresponds to an initial inspection tinitial at 2293 FH. 
Figure 12 shows how tinitial depends on varying adet from 0.5 – 3.5 mm (almost the entire range covered 
by the POD in Fig. 9). Choosing smaller detectable crack lengths for the reverse calculations has the 
hypothetical effect of reducing the initial inspection time, as can be understood from figures 4 and 11. 
However, this should be interpreted as follows. Given a particular inspection method, earlier inspections 
will find some smaller cracks, but with less reliability (POD). As discussed in step 3, there will actually 
be an optimum initial inspection time that minimises the total number of inspections. 
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Fig. 11. Example reverse calculations for adet =1.52 mm and pth = 0.1%, showing 1%, 50% and 99% 
crack growth curves; step 2a → PDF-adet ; step 2b → tinitial at 2293 FH; and step 2c → PDF-
tinitial  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 12. Initial inspection time tinitial for different values of the in-service detectable crack length adet 
 
Step 3: Forward crack growth analyses including inspections: Determine repeat inspections 
 
The forward crack growth analyses starts at tinitial (which depends on the choice of adet , see figure 12) 
and used the crack distribution PDF-tinitial illustrated in figure 11. This crack length distribution and the 
POD are now the only two random variables in the stochastic analyses. This is a necessary condition, 
enforced by the reversed crack growth analyses, to re-arrive at the service life failure distribution.  
The analyses were done for adet in the range 0.5 – 3.5 mm, as before, determining the initial inspection 
time, and for various numbers of repeat inspections in the range 2 – 50, i.e. different repeat inspection 
  
NLR-TP-2008-099 
  
 21 
intervals Δtrepeat. This resulted in a collection of inspection schemes, which were all analysed separately. 
For each inspection in the scheme, a detectable crack length apod was drawn randomly from the POD 
distribution (by drawing a random number P in the range 0 – 1 and substituting this value in the inverse 
POD: apod = POD-1(P), see also figure 9), reflecting the quality of the inspection. There were two 
conditions imposed on the calculations: 
 
• Once a crack was "found" (a ≥ apod) the component was assumed to be replaced or repaired. The 
replacement or repaired component was then given another period tinitial and a corresponding crack 
length randomly drawn from PDF-tinitial before the forward crack growth analysis continued. 
• All analyses were stopped after 5310 simulated flight hours, the average life in the baseline 
deterministic analysis, see figures 7 and 8. This enabled direct comparison of the SLAP and 
deterministic approaches.  
Also, it was possible for a crack to be missed during all the inspections, leading to “failure”, i.e. 
functional impairment.  
For each of the above inspection schemes 100,000 Monte-Carlo simulations were performed to 
determine the POF value. The results of all these Monte-Carlo simulations are presented in figures 13 
and 14. 
Figure 13 gives the POF dependence on tinitial and the total number of planned inspections, ninsp. Figure 
14 shows curves of equal POF level as function of the initial inspection time and total number of 
inspections, which is the most important result from SLAP. This figure shows that for a given POF level 
an optimum inspection scheme exists, denoted by the dots, minimizing the number of inspections.  
The values for initial inspection times are between 2300 and 2400 flight hours. In turn, this means that 
the optimum initial inspection time is obtained when the in-service detectable crack length adet is 
between 1.5 – 1.8 mm, see figure 12. This value of adet is the 69/50% percentile of the POD function, see 
figure 9, which is very different from ad (2,54 mm), the 90/95% percentile specified by the Damage 
Tolerance requirements [1]. Hence SLAP shows that it is more economical to begin inspecting when the 
chance of detecting a crack is still fairly low – but not too low, as the left-hand upturns in figures 13 and 
14 indicate.  
The curve shapes in figures 13 and 14 may be explained as follows: 
 
• If the initial inspection time is too early, some of the early inspections will be useless because cracks 
will still be too small to detect. This leaves fewer planned inspections to detect the cracks, thereby 
increasing the POF (figure 13), or else more inspections must be planned to achieve the required 
POF (figure 14). 
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• If the initial inspection time is too long, then because cracks will generally be growing faster there 
will be less time to detect them. This requires shorter repeat inspection intervals to maintain the POF 
levels. 
 
 
 
Fig. 13. Probability of failure as function of the time at initial inspection tinitial for several values of the 
total number of inspections ninsp 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 14. Contour plots for several POF values as functions of the time at initial inspection tinitial and total 
number of inspections ninsp until teconomic = 5310 FH. 
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The final issue is selection of the appropriate POF. As mentioned in subsection 1.3, the POF for the 
lifetime safety of military aircraft structures should be about 10-3. However, the longerons are not safety-
critical, and so it is possible to select a higher POF value, say 10-2. This results in the following 
inspection scheme: 
 
Initial inspection  2350 FH 
Repeat inspection    215 FH 
 
Table 2 summarises and compares the most important results obtained from the SLAP approach with 
those from the baseline Damage Tolerance deterministic analysis. The SLAP analyses resulted in 
slightly earlier initial inspections, but much increased repeat inspection intervals, and hence a greatly 
reduced number of inspections during the lifetime. In practical terms this means that SLAP shows it is 
possible to greatly reduce the inspection costs while maintaining a required POF. This can be optimized 
even more when the possibility of variable repeat inspection intervals is taken into account, instead of 
the constant intervals used here. 
 
Table 2 Comparison of SLAP and deterministic results for the longeron functional impairment life of 
5310 FH 
 Deterministic SLAP 
adet (mm) 2.54 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.52 
POF Unknown 10-3 5*10-3 10-2 5*10-2 
tinitial (FH) 2655 2300 2330 2350 2400 
Δtrepeat (FH) 62 158 188 215 323 
ninsp 43 19 15 14 9 
 
 
4 Concluding remarks 
An alternative fatigue life philosophy SLAP (Stochastic Life APproach) has been presented, and 
demonstrated for in-service inspection of the upper longerons of F-16 aircraft from the Royal 
Netherlands Air Force. SLAP can serve as an alternative to the baseline deterministic Damage Tolerance 
approach. This may be concluded from the results, which gave well-founded estimates of initial 
inspection times and repeat inspection schemes that differed significantly from the deterministic ones 
and demonstrated the excessive conservatism of the Damage Tolerance approach. 
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Advantages of SLAP: 
 
• The unrealistic concept of Equivalent Initial Flaw Sizes is not required. Neither are fatigue initiation 
and early crack growth models. This is a major advantage, since there are no well-established 
models for these phenomena in aircraft structures.  
• SLAP’s stochastic features introduce reliability-based design. This is becoming increasingly 
necessary, because the continuing optimisation of aircraft structures will make them less reliable if 
historically-based safety factors are used. 
• Only a very limited number of random variables are introduced. In principal, the entire scatter is 
covered by the failure distribution, which can be conservatively determined from a limited number 
of tests (preferably done with realistic load sequences) and later improved by in-service inspection 
data. In addition, a conservative POD distribution is required. This can be obtained from a well-
known handbook Rummel [8] or based on in-service inspection data as demonstrated here.  
• The SLAP approach is reasonably straightforward and readily applied in an engineering 
environment using the current deterministic Damage Tolerance approach: this is important for new 
methods to become accepted. 
• SLAP fits in very well with the current inspection philosophy applied by military and civil 
operators, and in more recent prognostic health management (PHM) systems. 
 
Issues needing to be explored and resolved: 
 
• SLAP’s validity needs to be more widely demonstrated. This includes realistic fatigue testing, 
preferably on components rather than coupons. This type of testing is much more costly, but coupon 
tests are anyway of questionable value, whichever design philosophy is used.  
• A minimum number of fatigue tests needs to be established, e.g. by reliability testing. 
• It must be shown that the failure distribution acting as the starting point for SLAP is always 
conservative (see Appendix A). The failure distribution should be updated during the service lives 
of the components, when originally based on a limited number of failure points: the usefulness of 
this should be explicitly demonstrated. 
• It must be shown that ignoring the scatter in material properties in the long crack growth period still 
leads to conservative results. 
• It should be examined whether scatter in the critical crack acr length at failure is significant for the 
analysis: this is unlikely, since the influence on life and hence POF is normally very small. 
• Examine the feasibility and necessity of including “rogue flaws”. This might be done by using a 
predefined chance of occurrence that can be integrated easily into the stochastic process. 
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Appendix A Weibull Analysis 
A.1 Introduction 
The failure distribution function for a component can be determined from experimental data provided 
there are sufficient failure points. Since the failure probability will be mainly determined by the lower 
tail of the failure distribution, one might think that a large number of tests is needed. However, if a 
lower bound for the failure distribution can be found from a limited number of tests, this would be 
initially acceptable. Then the design can be based on the lower bound of the distribution function, and 
in-service data can be used to update and improve the estimate of the failure distribution. 
In-service inspections provide non-failure and failure data, both of which are used to improve the 
estimated failure distribution, as discussed below. The non-failure data consist only of usage times at the 
moment of inspection, while failure data will consist of the inspection times and detected crack lengths. 
These latter data are not actual failures, but extrapolations using a validated fatigue crack growth model.  
The Weibull analysis method (Dodson [12]) is very suitable for the above problem, for the following 
reasons: 
 
• The Weibull distribution function plays an important role in failure analysis and is often the most 
suitable distribution to describe a failure mode. 
• An initial conservative lower bound estimate of the actual failure distribution can be obtained with 
only a few failures (Chapter 2, Dodson [12]). Even if only non-failure data are available, an initial 
conservative lower bound of the failure distribution can be determined by means of a Weibayes or 
Weibest analysis. 
 
A.2 Parameter estimation 
Mathematically the Weibull distribution function is defined as: 
 
β
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where 
 
t = time to failure 
t0 = location parameter 
η = scale parameter 
β = shape parameter 
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F(t) is the so-called cumulative distribution function and f(t) is the probability density function 
obtained by differentiating F(t): 
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• F(t) represents the fraction of components failed at time t, which can also be expressed as R(t) = 1 - 
F(t), called the reliability since it is the fraction that has survived at time t.  
• The location parameter t0 represents the starting point of the distribution (no failures are present 
before this time). 
• The sum of t0 and the scale parameter η is a measure of the characteristic life of the component and 
represents the time when 63.2% of the components have failed. 
• The shape parameter β is a measure of the speed of the failure mechanism and normally lies in the 
range 2 – 6. A value of β > 1 denotes a wear-out failure mode, and β ≥ 4 or higher denotes a very 
fast failure mode (rapid wear-out). A value of β = 1 indicates a constant failure rate independent of 
the elapsed time, i.e. the failures are random and lack memory of the past. A value of β < 1 denotes 
a decreasing failure rate, i.e. increasing reliability as the component ages: this is referred to as infant 
mortality rate. 
 
The unknown values of the parameters t0, β and η are determined from a set of available data points, 
which may be a mix of failed and non-failed sample times, so-called multiple censored data. Various 
methods exist to fit these three parameters, of which the method of maximum likelihood is preferred. 
This method is based on a so-called likelihood function L, which describes the probability of obtaining 
the observed data and is able to handle multiple censored data: 
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where: 
n = number of failed samples 
N = total number of samples 
 
F(t) and f(t) are respectively the cumulative distribution function and probability density function. These 
are given by equations A.1 and A.2 in the case of the Weibull distribution function. 
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The three parameters t0, β and η are now found by maximising the likelihood function (A.3). This is 
done by differentiating the natural-logarithm of equation A.3 (ln(L)) with respect to t0, β and η and 
equating the result to zero, resulting in equations A.4, A.5 and A.6: 
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The values of t0, β and η are determined iteratively from equations A.4, A.5 and A.6. An appropriate 
scheme is given by Dodson [12]. The t0, β and η are only estimates of the real values, and are therefore 
denoted by the symbol ^. Obviously, the more failure and non-failure data that are available, the better 
the estimates will be. A confidence interval can be determined (Dodson [12]) that contains the true 
values of these parameters, provided an appropriate confidence level is selected. To ensure a 
conservative estimate of the failure distribution, the lower bound value for the location t0 and scale 
parameter η can be selected and the upper bound value for the shape parameter β . 
Even if only non-failure data are available, an estimate of the parameters can be made. A value for β is 
assumed that is based on historical failure data of similar components, or else engineering judgement. A 
lower confidence bound of 63.2% for η can be found by setting n equal to 1 in equation A.6. This 
resembles the situation where the first failure is assumed to be imminent and is called the Weibayes 
method. However, assuming that the first failure is imminent is often very conservative. A less 
conservative approach is to select n=0.693, resulting in a 50% lower confidence bound with respect to 
the true Weibull failure distribution, the so-called Weibest method. For more details see Dodson [12]. 
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Appendix B Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit test 
There are many goodness-of-fit tests, for example Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Anderson-Darling. The 
Anderson-Darling test is more sensitive to deviations in the tails of a distribution than the older 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. These tests do not tell you that you do have a certain type of distribution 
function, they only tell you when the data make it (un)likely that you do. 
The Anderson-Darling test statistic value is determined by (e.g. Dodson [12]): 
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where F( ) is the cumulative distribution function and n is the number of observations. The result from 
equation B.1 needs to be modified for small sampling values. For the Weibull distribution the 
modification of A² is: 
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The Am² value must then be compared with critical values, A²crit , which depend on the significance level 
α and the distribution type. As an example, for the Weibull distribution the determined A² value has to 
be less than the following critical values for acceptance of goodness-of-fit:  
 
α 0.1 0.05 0.025 0.01 
A2crit 0.637 0.757 0.877 1.038 
 
 
  
 
